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ESTATE TAX-PROCEEDS oF FLIGHT INsuRA-CE, NOT INCLUD-
ABL-E IN GRoss EsTATE
Decedent, immediately before boarding an airplane, purchased two
flight insurance policies, each signed by the decedent and naming his wife
as beneficiary. The premiums were paid by the wife and the policies de-
livered to her. Both' insured against loss of life and specified bodily in-
juries resulting from an aircraft accident during the flight, and each re-
served to the insured the right to change the beneficiary or assign the
policy without the consent of the named beneficiary. The plane crashed,
killing all aboard, and the widow of the decedent received the death benefits.
When the executors failed to include these benefits in the gross estate, the
Commissioner asserted a deficiency which was sustained by the Tax Court.'
The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the phrase "insurance under
policies on the life of the decedent" contained in section 2042(2) 2 does not
include accident policies of the kind here in question. 3 Estate of Noel v.
Commissioner, 332 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1964), petition for cert. filed, 33
U.S.L. Week 3092 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1964) (No. 14441).
While section 2042(2) demands the inclusion of proceeds from "in-
surance under policies on the life of the decedent," 4 neither the statute
I Estate of Marshal L. Noel, 39 T.C. 466 (1962). The Tax Court held that
it was "too late" to raise the contention that accident insurance is not covered by
§ 2042 because "the matter has been settled for too long a period to warrant re-
examination." Id. at 470.
2 INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 2042(2).
8 The court relied on two arguments to substantiate its contention that accident
insurance is not included under the insurance section of the revenue law. First,
the "plain meaning rule" as applied to the phrase "insurance under policies on
the life of the decedent" excludes accident insurance. Instant case at 952. The
second and more substantial argument is that the House report accompanying the
Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, §402(f), 40 Stat. 1098, reveals that Congress did
not intend to include accident insurance. The report stated:
The provision with respect to specific beneficiaries has been included for
the reason that insurance payable to such beneficiaries usually passes under
a contract to which the insurance company and the individual beneficiary
are the parties in interest and over which the executor exercises no control.
Amounts passing in this way are not liable for expenses of administration
or debts of the decedent and therefore do not fall within the [then] existing
provisions defining the gross estate. It has been brought to the attention of
the Committee that wealthy persons have and now anticipate resorting to
this method of defeating the estate tax.
H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1918).
4 The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property-
(2) Receivable by other beneficiaries.-To the extent of the amount
receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies on the life
of the decedent with respect to which the decedent possessed at his death
any of the incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone or in conjunction
with any other person.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2042.
(445)
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nor the regulations adequately define what is meant by that phrase. 5
Only one reported case, Leopold Ackerman,6 appears to have considered
the includibility of death benefits from accident insurance, and it was there
held that the distinction between accident and life insurance was irrelevant
for purposes of the estate tax, such benefits falling within the life insurance
section. 7 The subsequent lack of litigation in the area seems to indicate
an acceptance of the Ackerman conclusion.8
Mr. Justice Holmes characterized the 1916 estate tax 9 as "a tax on
the right to transmit" property from the dead to the living which attached
to the "whole estate except so far as the statute set a limit." 10 Consistent
with this interpretation, the 1918 reenactment of the estate tax added a
provision for the inclusion in the gross estate of proceeds from insurance
on the life of the decedent whether paid to the estate or named bene-
ficiaries." The same basic provision is included in the current Code.
12
Since the estate tax is concerned with the transfer of property by rea-
son of death, it embraces only those interests arising at death. 13 In deter-
mining the valuation of contingent death benefits of certain employment
contracts, the court in Goodman v. Granger 14 stated: "[T]he estate tax
is neither concerned with changes in property interests nor values prior to
death. The tax is measured by the value of assets transferred by reason
of death, the critical value being that which is determined as of the time
of death." 15
Similarly, alleged annuity benefits have been held to come within the
general definition of the gross estate,' 6 regardless of the type of interest
5 "The term 'insurance' refers to life insurance of every description, including
death benefits paid by fraternal beneficial societies, operating under the lodge system."
Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1 (a) (1958).
6 15 B.T.A. 635 (1929).
7 In reaching this conclusion the Board of Tax Appeals pointed out that in both
cases "the risk assumed by the insurer is the loss of the insured's life, and the
payment of the insurance money is contingent upon the loss of life." Id. at 637.
8 The Internal Revenue Service had previously ruled that "where an airplane
passenger, prior to his death in an airplane crash, purchased an accident insurance
policy on his life, the proceeds of the policy are includable in his gross estate .
Rev. Rul. 61-123, 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 151.
9 Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 202, 39 Stat. 777.
10 New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
11 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 402(f), 40 Stat. 1098. Previously, the pro-
ceeds of insurance were included in the gross estate only when they were paid to
the executor of the decedent's estate. Section 402(f) was enacted to prevent a non-
taxable transfer of the property by means of insurance paid to named beneficiaries.
Originally, the act provided for a $40,000 deduction which has since been abolished.
12 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2042(2).
13 See, e.g., United States Trust Co. v. Helvering, 307 U.S. 57 (1939); Young
Men's Christian Ass'n v. Davis, 264 U.S. 47 (1924); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S.
41 (1900) ; Goodman v. Granger, 243 F.2d 264 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835
(1957) ; Christierin v. Manning, 138 F. Supp. 923 (D.N.J. 1956).
14 242 F.2d 264 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957).
15 Id. at 269.
16 Since 1954 annuities have been included in the gross estate under INT. Rav.
CODE OF 1954, § 2039. Previously, they were included under the section of the
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owned by the decedent while he was alive.17 The. court in Commissioner
v. Wilder's Estate,18 holding four annuity benefits includable in the gross
estate, stated that the substance and practical effect, rather than the
technicalities of contracts and conveyances, were determinative of the
taxability of the transfer.' 9 The rationale of the' Goodman and Wilder
cases should be applicable to life insurance in that all three of these inter-
ests arise at death.
However, the present court's definition of "insurance policies" implies
that includibility under section 2042 is to be determined solely by the type
of insurance interest owned by the decedent before death. Thus, if there
is a high degree of risk that the contingencies required for payment of death
benefits will not arise, the decedent obtains an insufficient interest in the
policy to meet the requirement of "insurance on the life of the decedent."
However, if airflight insurance is excluded on this ground,20 any uncer-
tainty could be a justification for nonincludibility.
All life insurance policies contain some risk, even if it is only that
the insured will die long before the premiums constitute an investment
which is substantial in relation to the benefits transmitted. Term life in-
surance, where there is a possibility of the policy expiring before death; 21
a long term policy which protects against death only by accidental means;
or even double indemnity benefits of ordinary life insurance policies could
be excluded under the same rationale. It seems clear that the court did
not intend its rationale to be extended this far, yet it is difficult to distin-
guish those insurance interests creating an "immediate estate" 22 from
those whereby the insured acquires only "an inchoate and defeasible
right." 23 Evidently, the motivation of the court in distinguishing the
types of insurance on the basis of their respective investment values is a
belief that the sole purpose of section 2042 is to prevent the use of life
insurance benefits payable to named beneficiaries as a means of tax avoid-
ance.24 While tax avoidance was no doubt a factor in the passage of this
section, it was merely one portion of the larger policy of taxing the transfer
of property by reason of death.
revenue lavs generally defining the gross estate as all interests "of which the
decedent has at any time made a transfer . . . intended to take effect in possession
or enjoyment at or after his death .... " Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §302(c),
44 Stat. 70.
17 See, e.g., Mearkle's Estate v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 386 (3d Cir. 1942);
Commissioner v. Clise, 122 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1941); Commissioner v. Wilder's
Estate, 118 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1941).
18 Ibid.
19 Id. at 282; see Commissioner v. Clise, 122 F.2d 998, 1004 (9th Cir. 1941).
2 0 Instant case at 952-53.
21 It is possible that the court did not intend to extend its rationale to cover
term insurance. See instant case at 952 n.2.
2 2 Id. at 952.
2
3Id. at 953.
24 Id. at 952-53.
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The courts have defined life insurance as those benefits received as a
result of transactions "designed to shift to a group of individuals the risk
of premature death . . *.." 25 While this definition has been utilized
chiefly in distinguishing annuities from life insurance,26 it has been extended
to other situations. 27 It would seem that such a definition should be applied
generally to clarify the phrase "insurance under policies on the life of the
decedent." 28 Clearly, accident insurance containing death benefits falls
within this pattern.
The use of the risk factor would prevent a possible loophole in the
tax laws by overturning the result in the present case. Section 101(a) 29
and its interpreting regulations 30 prevent death benefits under accident
insurance from being taxed as income, so that the effect of the present
court's holding is to allow such proceeds to be completely exempt from
taxation.
Furthermore, the suggested definition would in no way affect the
incidents of ownership test under section 2042.81 The incidents test
was enacted to permit the insured to dispose of life insurance with the same
facility as any other property 3 2  When the owner of an insurance policy
containing substantial property value as an investment desires to give
25 Helvering v. LeGierse, 312 U.S. 531, 540 (1941); see Estate of Keller v.
Commissioner, 312 U.S. 543 (1941).
[T]he amounts must be received as the result of a transaction which involved
an actual "insurance risk" at the time the transaction was executed. His-
torically and commonly insurance involves risk-shifting and risk-distributing.
. . . That these elements of risk-shifting and risk-distributing are essential
to a life insurance contract is agreed by courts and commentators.
Helvering v. LeGierse, .mpra at 539.
28 This distinction has become largely meaningless since 1954 when the $40,000
exemption for life insurance was abolished. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2042.
27 Commissioner v. Traganowan, 183 F.2d 288 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
853 (1950) (proceeds from New York Stock Exchange Gratuity Fund held to be
life insurance) ; Chew's Estate v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1945) (insur-
ance premiums refunded after decedent's suicide held not to be insurance).
28 The incorporation of a similar definition into the regulations could help
eliminate the confusion. While such a regulation could be disregarded or overridden
by a court, it could be promulgated quickly and might discourage other courts from
taking the position adopted in the instant case.
29 "[G]ross income does not include amounts received . . . under a life insur-
ance contract, if such amounts are paid by reason of death of the insured." INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 101(a) (1).
30 "Death benefits having the characteristics of life insurance proceeds payable
by reason of death under contracts, such as . . . accident and health insurance con-
tracts, are covered by this provision." Treas. Reg. § 1.101-1 (a) (1957).
81 Amounts receivable from insurance under policies on the life of the decedent
"with respect to which the decedent possessed at his death any of the incidents of
ownership, exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any other person" are
includable. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2042.
82 No other property is subject to estate tax where the decedent initially
purchased it and then long before his death gave away all rights to the
property.
The bill retains the present rule including life insurance proceeds in the
decedent's estate if the policy is owned by him or payable to his executor,
but the premium test has been removed.
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1954).
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away all his rights under that policy, the incidents test would guarantee
that the proceeds not be included in the gross estate of the original owner,
even if he continued to pay the premiums. 33 In the present case petitioner
had principally contended that under the incidents test the proceeds should
not be included in the gross estate.34 He argued that the decedent had
divested himself of all incidents of ownership by transferring the policies
to his wife; 35 however, the Third Circuit found 86 that the decedent's
reservation of the right to change the beneficiary was a valid incident,
3 7
even though it was practically impossible actually to exercise this right.38
Of course, even if the court had found that there had been a valid
transfer, the proceeds might still be taxable as a gift made in contemplation
of death,39 provided decedent's wife had not paid the premiums. 40 How-
ever, if the wife did pay the premiums and the decedent transferred the
33Id. at B14 (minority report).
3 4 This argument was advanced before the Tax Court, Estate of Marshall L. Noel,
39 T.C. 466 (1962), and before the present court, Brief for the Appellants, pp. 7-19.
35 Id. at 7-12.
36 Instant case at 951.
37 See, e.g., Farvell v. United States, 243 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1957) ; Singer v.
Shaughnessy, 198 F.2d 178, 181 (2d Cir. 1952); Hall v. Wheeler, 174 F. Supp.
418 (D. Me. 1959); Fried v. Granger, 105 F. Supp. 564 (W.D. Pa. 1952), aff'd per
curiam, 202 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1953).
38 See Estate of John J. Round, 40 T.C. 970 (1963); Estate of Virginia H.
West, 9 T.C. 736 (1947), aff'd, 173 F.2d 505 (8th Cir. 1949) ; Estate of Edward L.
Hurd, 6 T.C. 819 (1946), aff'd, 160 F.2d 610 (1st Cir. 1947). These cases concern
the impossibility of utilizing powers under a trust.
It was said by the circuit court in Hurd v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 610, 613
(1st Cir. 1947) : "The statute [estate tax law] is not concerned with the manner in
which the power is exercised, but rather with the existence of the power."
39 Under § 2035(b) any transfer of property made within three years of death
is presumed to have been made in contemplation of death. Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-1(c),
(d) (1958).
The phrase "gifts in contemplation of death" is construed in the regulations to
include transfers "(1) made with the purpose of avoiding death taxes, (2) made as
a substitute for a testamentary disposition of property, or (3) made for any other
motive associated with death." Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-1(c) (1958); see Slifka v.
Johnson, 161 F.2d 467 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 758 (1947); Vanderlip v.
Commissioner, 155 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 726 (1946).
4oLiebman v. Hassett, 148 F.2d 247 (1st Cir. 1945) (value of policy at time of
death minus proportion of value of policy paid in premiums by transferee included
in the gross estate); INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2035(a); accord, Vanderlip v.
Commissioner, supra note 39; Estate of Arthur H. Hull, 38 T.C. 512 (1962).
The transferring of insurance for valuable consideration would result in the
taxation of the proceeds as income to the extent that they exceed the consideration
and subsequent premiums paid, with the exceptions of transfers to partners, partner-
ships in which the insured is a partner, or corporations in which the insured is a
stockholder or officer. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 101(a) (2).
In the present case there seems to be some doubt as to who actually paid the
premiums. The Tax Court states that they were "not entirely convinced" by the
wife's testimony that she paid the premiums, and that they were not making any
specific finding one way or the other as to this matter. Estate of Marshal L. Noel,
39 T.C. 466, 471 (1962). The opinion of the Third Circuit asserts that the wife
did pay the premiums. Instant case at 951. While the Brief for Appellant, p. 3,
states that the wife testified that she paid the premiums, the Government's brief makes
no mention of the matter.
19651
450 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.113
incidents of ownership, there would appear to be no estate tax consequences
at decedent's death 4 1
Since most people buying flight insurance are not concerned with
whether the policy contains a right to change beneficiary, insurance com-
panies could simply eliminate this power from the policy and thus enable
the proceeds to remain outside section 2042. Furthermore, providing a
section in the contract allowing specification of the person who paid the
premium would enable the taxpayer to show that the decedent had not paid
the premiums and therefore had no interest to transfer.
42
The argument that the policy of the incidents test is inapplicable to
accident insurance because of its very small investment value is without
merit, because it ignores the fact that the relationship of the premium to
the ultimate benefits received is basically the same in all types of insurance.
In each the premium is proportional to the risk assumed by the insurance
company. Accident insurance pays a large benefit for a small premium
because the probability of the accident occurring is small. On the other
hand, a periodic premium life insurance policy requires a much higher
investment in return for the promise to pay the same benefit because the
event of death is inevitable. However, in each the insured pays fair
value for the anticipated benefit. The incidents of ownership test, there-
fore, is as relevant to accident insurance as it is to any other type of life
insurance.
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT-CERTFICATION BY ATTORNEY
GENERAL HELD PREREQUISITE TO GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES'
IMMUNITY
Third party defendant, the driver of a government-owned truck
involved in an accident with defendant's automobile, made motions in a
state court for summary judgment and for dismissal of the third-party
demand 1 on the ground that he was immune from suit under the provisions
of the Federal Tort Claims Act.2  Presenting affidavits showing that he
41 See Liebmann v. Hassett, supra note 40, at 251, where it was held that the
proportionate part of the insurance purchased by the transferee should be excluded
from the gross estate.
42 While this procedure could be simplified by allowing persons other than
the insured to purchase the policy and sign it as applicant, it would seem that insur-
ance companies would be hesitant in taking such action because of the danger of
issuing void policies to persons lacking an insurable interest in the decedent. This
seems especially true in the case of sales made from vending machines. See Walker,
Current Developments in Estate Tax Planning, U. So. CAL. 1962 TAX INsT. 825, 840.
1 Plaintiff, a passenger in the truck, brought suit in state court against the
automobile operator, her husband, and their liability- insurer for injuries received in
the accident. The liability insurer then instituted a third-party demand against the
driver of the truck, a Sergeant in the United States Army.
228 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1958), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (Supp.
IV, 1963).
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was an employee of the United States Government and was within the
scope of his employment at the time of the accident,8 he contended that the
third-party plaintiff's exclusive remedy would be a suit against the United
States under section 2679(b) of the act.4 The trial court granted the
motion, but the state court of appeal, one judge dissenting, reversed. The
court of appeal held that although section 2679(b) permits dismissal of a
tort action against a gov ement employee upon a showing that the em-
ployee was acting within theI scope of his employment, section 2679(d)
represents a legislative mandatethat this immunity cannot be granted
unless the United States, through the Attorney General, accepts respon-
sibility for the employee's acts by certifying that the employee was acting
within the scope of his employment and by removing the case to a federal
court.6 Jarrell v. Gordy, 162 So. 2d 577 (La. Ct. App. 1964).
The pertinent provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act, as amended
in 1961, provide:
(b) The remedy by suit against the United States as provided by
section 1346(b) of this title . . . for personal injury . . .
resulting from the operation by any employee of the Government
of any motor vehicle while acting within the scope of his office or
employment, shall hereafter be exclusive of any other civil action
or proceeding ....
(d) Upon a certification by the Attorney General that the em-
ployee was acting within the scope of his employment . . . any
such civil action or proceeding commenced in a state court shall be
removed without bond at any time before trial by the Attorney
General to the district court of the United States . . . and the
proceedings deemed a tort action brought against the United
States. . . . Should a United States district court determine on
a hearing on a motion to remand held before a trial on the merits
3 Two affidavits were offered, one executed by the employee's immediate superior
and the other executed by the employee himself.
428 U.S.C. §2679(b) (Supp. IV, 1963). For the relevant provisions of this
statute, see text accompanying note 6 infra.
5After the decision of the Louisiana Court of Appeal, the United States
Attorney, who had defended Sergeant Coffey in the original suit and on appeal,
gave his certificate; the case was removed to the district court, and Sergeant Coffey
was dismissed. Letter From Q. L. Stewart, United States Attorney, to the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Law Review, Aug. 5, 1964, on file in the Biddle Law Library,
University of Pennsylvania Law School.
The United States Attorney also stated that "no such certification was filed
in Trial Court as such appeared wholly unnecessary because Sergeant Coffey urged
his personal immunity as provided for in subsection (b) of section 2679 and filed
affidavits in proof of his Federal employment status, which were accepted by the
Trial Court and which have not been contested by Allstate Insurance Company."
Brief in Support of Application for Rehearing of Third-Party Defendant-Appellee,
p. 9.
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that the case so removed is one in which a remedy within the
meaning of subsection (b) . . . is not available against the
United States, the case shall be remanded to the state court.6
Prior to 1961 a person injured by a government employee-driver,
acting within the scope of his employment, could sue either the employee
personally or the United States.7 The purpose of the 1961 amendment
was to protect the employee from this personal liability when he was
within the scope of his employment,8 thereby freeing him from the expense
of carrying liability insurance to cover these activities.9  By making an
action against the United States the sole remedy, the amendments were
to "exclude suits against employees in their individual capacities on the
same claim." 10
The present court relied on Gustafson v. Peck 11 and on language in
the House report accompanying the 1961 amendments 12 for support of its
interpretation that certification is a prerequisite to the government em-
ployee's immunity from personal liability.13 However, the Gustafson case
is not directly on point, since there the Attorney General had already issued
a certificate, and the court decided only that the federal government had
a right under the Federal Tort Claims Act to intervene and remove the
case to a federal court.14 Likewise, the House report provides no support
628 U.S.C. §2679(b), (d) (Supp. IV, 1963). 28 U.S.C. §1346(b) (1958)
also provides:
Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts . . .
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United
States, for money damages . . . for injury or loss of property, or personal
injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the government while acting in the scope of his office or employ-
ment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would
be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the
act or omission occurred.
7The exclusive remedy provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act had applied
only to actions against federal agencies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (1958).
s H.R. REP. No. 297, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1961) [hereinafter cited as H.R.
REP. No. 297] ; Letter From Franklin Floete, Administrator of the General Services
Administration, to Honorable Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the House of Represen-
tatives, Jan. 9, 1961, in 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2789 (1961) [hereinafter
cited as Franklin Floete Letter].
9 Franklin Floete Letter 2791.
10 H.R RP. No. 297, at 4; see Perez v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 571
(S.D.N.Y. 1963).
11216 F. Supp. 370 (N.D. Iowa 1963).
12 H.R. REP. No. 297, at 5.
13 Instant case at 580-81.
14 The Gustafson court stated that if the United States accepted responsibility,
the employee would be relieved of liability. 216 F. Supp. at 372. The court in the
instant case concluded from this statement that certification by the Attorney General
was equivalent to acceptance of responsibility by the United States, and, therefore,
if certification was not given, there could be no acceptance of responsibility. Instant
case at 580. However, certification by the Attorney General is not determinative
of the substantive issue of scope of employment, since a federal court has the power,
even after certification, to determine that the employee was not in the scope of
employment at the time of the accident and, therefore, is not immune. See Tavolieri
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for the court's interpretation, since the original House proposal did not
contain a provision for certification by the Attorney General.' 5 Rather, it
had provided that every action commenced in a state court against an
employee-driver could be removed by the employee to the federal court
which would then determine whether any remedy existed against the
United States.' 6 The Senate Committee on the Judiciary refused to allow
every case to be removed and substituted a provision allowing removal
only where the plaintiff consented.' 7 Senator Keating, in debate on the
Senate floor, criticized this provision, evidently assuming that the plaintiff
could hold the employee personally liable, even if he was in the scope of his
employment at the time of the accident, merely by refusing to have the case
removed to federal court. He stated that:
The purpose of the bill is to make the United States wholly liable
for any damages caused by its employees in the course of their
duties and to protect the employee from any dual liability. This
purpose would be frustrated if plaintiffs can continue to proceed
against individual employees in State court proceedings.'8
The certification provision was then substituted and became section
2679(d).' 9 There are two possible ways to interpret the import of the
certification provision from this legislative history. Senator Keating, who
had critized the "plaintiff's consent" provision as giving the plaintiff the
right to determine whether an action against the employee could be con-
verted to one under the Federal Tort Claims Act, introduced the certifica-
tion provision. It is possible that he intended the Attorney General, by
either granting or refusing certification, to have the right to determine
whether an action against the employee could be converted to one under
the Federal Tort Claims Act. If this was the intended purpose of the
provision, the court's conclusion that certification is a prerequisite to the
employee's immunity is correct.20 On the other hand, the provision can be
interpreted as providing only a procedure for protecting the plaintiff from
being required to go to federal court in every case, which had been pro-
vided in the House proposal. In the debate on the Senate floor, it was
v. Allain, 222 F. Supp. 756 (D. Mass. 1963); Adams v. Jackel, 220 F. Supp. 764
(E.D.N.Y. 1963). Thus, acceptance of responsibility depends not on certification,
but on the courts determination that the employee was within the scope of his
employment.
15 H.R. REP. No. 297, at 5.
18 Ibid.
17 S. REP. No. 736, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1961).
Is 107 CONG. Rac. 18500 (1961). (Emphasis added.) In 1960 similar amend-
ments, also containing a plaintiff's consent provision, passed both the House and
Senate. 106 CONG. REc. 11646, 11924 (1960). However, President Eisenhower
vetoed the bill, calling the consent provision unfortunate, since "any plaintiff, by
refusing to give his consent, could prevent the conversion of the action to one
under the Federal Tort Claims Act and thus thwart the sound purposes of the
original bill." 106 CONG. REc. 12455 (1960).
'9 107 CONG. REc. 18500 (1961).
20 The court in the instant case did not offer this possible interpretation of the
legislative history as a basis for their decision. See text accompanying note 22 infra.
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stated that the certification provision was intended to protect the plaintiff
from having cases improperly removed. 2 1 If this were the sole purpose, the
employee should be allowed to plead the statute as a defense in the state
court when certification is not given, since the plaintiff will have a full
determination of the issues in the state court, the forum which he has
chosen.
The strongest reason for the court's conclusion was its concern that
the plaintiff's rights might be adversely affected if the employee were able
to plead the Federal Tort Claims Act as a defense in the state court when
certification is not given.22 If there is no certification and the state court
determines that the employee, being in the scope of his employment, is
immune, a plaintiff may be barred from commencing suit in federal court,
since the Federal Tort Claims Act provides that suit must be brought
against the United States within two years from the time the action ac-
crued.2 However, a plaintiff can easily protect himself from this difficulty
by commencing suit both in federal and state court.
24
There is a possibility that the plaintiff may be deprived of his rights
even if the statute of limitations problem is averted. Although the policy
of the Federal Tort Claims Act, in expressly providing a remedy for plain-
tiffs against the United States, may give sufficient guarantee that the
federal court will accept the state court's determination of state law on
scope of employment, the federal court will probably not be bound by
the state court's determination, since the United States was not a party
in the state proceedings. Thus, if certification is not a prerequisite, a
plaintiff may be deprived of any remedy, since the state court may find
that the employee was in the scope of his employment and therefore im-
mune, while the federal court may find that the employee was outside the
scope of his employment and therefore deny the plaintiff a remedy against
the United States.
21 107 CONG. REc. 18500 (1961) (remarks of Senator Keating).
22 Instant case at 583.
23 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (1958).
24 See Adams v. Jackel, 220 F. Supp. 764 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).
Under the federal rules a civil action is commenced merely by filing a complaint
with the court. FED. R. Crv. P. 3, 4(a).
Another solution would be to extend the statute of limitations in cases where
the state court had found a driver-employee within the scope of employment and
immune under the act. Compare 64 Stat. 1112, 46 U.S.C. §745 (1958) (statute
extended under Suits in Admiralty Act).
If the plaintiff could commence a suit in a federal court and join the United
States and the employee as defendants, these difficulties could be avoided with
little inconvenience to the plaintiff. However, unless there is diversity of citizenship
between the plaintiff and the employee and a claim for the requisite jurisdictional
amount, the federal court will not have jurisdiction over the employee, even under
the concept of ancillary jurisdiction. See Benbow v. Wolf, 217 F.2d 203 (9th Cir.
1954) ; WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 9, at 19 (1963).
However, in the instant case the federal court would have had jurisdiction since
the determination of whether a military officer is within his scope of employment
is a federal question. See Friedman v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 600 (N.D. Ill.
1956); Paly v. United States, 125 F. Supp. 798, 804 (D. Md.), aff'd per curiam,
221 F.2d 958 (4th Cir. 1954) ; 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1958).
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A possible solution which would both protect the plaintiff's rights and
preserve the immunity of the employee who was in the scope of his employ-
ment, even when certification was not given, would be to give collateral
estoppel effect to the state court's determination. 25 If collateral estoppel
applies, the plaintiff's rights will not be adversely affected since, if the
state court finds that the employee was within the scope of his employment
and therefore immune, the plaintiff will be assured of recovering from the
United States.
One requirement for the application of collateral estoppel would ap-
pear to be satisfied by section 2679(c) of the Federal Tort Claims Act,
which provides that the "Attorney General shall defend any civil action
or proceeding brought in any court against any employee of the government
for any such damage or injury." 26  It would seem that this section requires
the Attorney General to defend suits in a state court even where he is
not willing to certify that the employee was in the scope of his employment.
The phrase "any court" certainly includes state courts, and the only time
when he would have to defend in a state court is where there has been
no certification.27  Thus the Attorney General should apply a more liberal
standard in determining whether to defend than in granting certification.
Since the statute includes the words "any such damage or injury," the
Attorney General must still exercise some discretion as to when he must
defend the suit. However, where there is any reason to believe that the
alleged damage or injury was caused by a government employee-driver
acting within the scope of his employment, there would be no justification
for refusal to defend. Having an officer employed by the United States
defending the case in state court under a mandate from the United States
implies that the United States is in control of the action.
2 8
25 "A person who is not a party but who controls an action . . . is bound by
the adjudications of litigated matter as if he were a party if he has a . . . financial
interest in the . . . determination of a question of fact or of a question of law with
reference to the same subject matter or transaction." RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS
§84 (1942).
Although collateral estoppel has been held inapplicable against the United States,
it was done so on the grounds that collateral estoppel cannot be used to circumvent
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Carr v. United States, 98 U.S. 433, 438
(1879). Compare United States v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506,
513 (1940).
This should not apply to the present case where the Government, by way of
the Federal Tort Claims Act, has expressly waived its sovereign immunity.
2628 U.S.C. § 2679(c) (Supp. IV, 1963). (Emphasis added.)
2
7 Even before adoption of the 1961 amendments, the Government had adopted
a policy of affording counsel and representation to employees who were sued indi-
vidually in state court. See H.R. REP. No. 297, at 3.
28 There is dictum to the effect that if the United States employs counsel or
otherwise aids in the conduct of a litigation it can be deemed a party to the litiga-
tion and will be bound by its results. See Drummond v. United States, 324 U.S.
316, 318 (1945) (dictum); United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 444 (1926)(dictum).Generally, if a private party employs counsel to represent its interests in a suit,
collateral estoppel can be applied against him. See Bros, Inc. v. W. E. Grace Mfg.
Co., 261 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1958) ; Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. International Harvester
Co., 120 F2d 82 (3d Cir. 1941) ; Warford Corp. v. Bryan Screw Mach. Prod. Co.,
44 F2d 713 (6th Cir. 1930).
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However, to apply collateral estoppel against the United States, it
should also be shown that it has a financial interest in the state court's
determination. 29 The United States' only interest in requiring the Attorney
General to defend in the state court is to provide the employee with ade-
quate counsel.2 0 In order for the Attorney General to provide a full defense
of the employee in state court, he might have to argue that the employee
was within the scope of his employment and therefore immune. But this
should not preclude the Attorney General from arguing in the federal court
that the employee was not in the scope of his employment, since the finan-
cial interest of the United States only arises in the federal court where its
liability is in question. Certainly, the United States should not be penalized
in protecting this interest in the federal court because of the Attorney
General's duty properly to defend the employee in the state court.
Absent the applicability of collateral estoppel in the present situation,
the court's conclusion seems completely justified. Although its interpreta-
tion creates a possible risk that a government employee-driver who was
actually in the scope of his employment may be deprived of his immunity.
because the Attorney General fails to certify, this risk appears small. If
the Attorney General construes his certification power liberally, granting
it whenever there is a possibility that the employee was within the scope
of his employment, it is unlikely that many employees will be wrongfully
denied their immunity. Since the federal court, even after certification,
can determine that the employee was not within the scope of his employ-
ment,3 1 there is little cause to think the Attorney General would be un-
reasonable in withholding certification.
32
LABOR LAW-NLRB REVERSES "ELECTION OF REmEDIES"
DocTRINE To PERMIT REFUSAL To BARGAIN CHARGE, ATER
REPRESENTATION ELECTION
After obtaining authorization cards from a majority of employees in
a proper bargaining unit, the union requested recognition as exclusive bar-
29 See note 25 supra.
30 See H.R. REP. No. 297, at 3, 5.
31 In Adams v. Jackel, 220 F. Supp. 764 (E.D.N.Y. 1963), the government
employee-driver made a motion to be dismissed from the suit after certification and
removal of the case to the federal court. The federal court denied the motion on
the grounds that, although certification suffices to effect removal, it does not deter-
mine the issue of whether the employee was, in fact, acting within the scope of his
employment.
If, after certifying, the Attorney General acquires other evidence which leads
him to believe that he certified improvidently, he should be able to withdraw his
certification. See Stephan v. Madison, 223 F. Supp. 256, 259 (E.D.N.Y. 1963) (by
implication).
32 Any possible risk to an employee which results from requiring certification
as a prerequisite to his immunity could be alleviated by providing the employee a
right to judicial review of the Attorney General's denial to certify.
Another recourse to an employee who contends that he has been unjustifiably
denied certification by the Attorney General would be to institute a private relief
bill in Congress. This procedure was permitted before passage of the 1961 amend-
ments. See H.R. REP. No. 297, at 3.
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gaining agent. Despite lack of factual basis for disbelieving that the union
had a majority, the employer denied recognition and refused to bargain.
The union then filed a representation petition with the National Labor
Relations Board, which scheduled an election. One working day before
the election and again on the day of the election, the employer engaged
in practices violating section 8(a) (1) of the National Labor Relations
Act.' The union first learned of these activities shortly before the election,
which was held as scheduled. After losing the election, the union filed
objections and then charged that the employer had violated section 8 (a) (5)
of the act 2 by his bad-faith refusal to bargain when the union had presented
evidence of its majority. In sustaining the unfair labor practice allegations,
the Board overruled its holding in Aiello Dairy Farms 3 that a union which
chooses to participate in a representation election, knowing of facts con-
stituting an unlawful refusal to bargain by the employer, has elected a
remedy in its drive for recognition and is estopped from raising section
8(a) (5) charges based on the employer's preelection conduct, Bernel
Foam Prods. Co., 146 N.L.R.B. No. 161 (May 4, 1964).4
149 Stat 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1958). The specific
§8(a) (1) charge in this case was that the employer, through mass meetings and
leaflets, promised changed working conditions and the introduction of job classifi-
cations if the union was defeated in the election.
249 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1958).
3 110 N.L.R.B. 1365 (1954). See also Franchester Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. 1391
(1954) (decided one day after Aiello).
4The argument before the trial examiner and the briefs to the Board were con-
structed along entirely different lines. The major issue was the relevance of an
exception to the Aiello doctrine, providing that where the unlawful conduct consti-
tuting the refusal to bargain occurs too close to the election for the union to take
effective steps by withdrawing its petition or filing charges before the balloting, the
election of remedies doctrine should not apply. 110 N.L.R.B. at 1370, 1374 (dictum) ;
accord, Traders Oil Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 746 (1957), enforced, 263 F.2d 835 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 829 (1959); Alexander Mfg. Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1457 (1954).
The difficulty in the instant case arose as a result of the General Counsel's belief
that the Board's decision finding a § 8(a)(5) violation in Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85
N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949), modified, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341
U.S. 914 (1951), applied to the instant fact situation. According to Joy Silk Mills,
the employer's unlawful conduct between the time of the initial demand for recog-
nition and the representation election established the employer's bad faith in refusing
to bargain upon request. The trial examiner in the present case denied that any
conduct violative of § 8(a) (1) occurred during this period, preventing application
of the Joy Silk Mills precedent and the use of the Aiello exception on the basis of
that type of conduct. The trial examiner did find, however, that the employer acted
in bad faith in refusing to recognize the union or participate in an impartial card
check and in demanding an election. In this fact situation, without supporting
§ 8(a) (1) violations to substantiate the union's claim of bad faith by the employer
in denying recognition, the union may bring a § 8(a) (5) charge. Snow & Sons, 134
N.L.R.B. 709 (1961), enforced, 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962). However, the trial
examiner applied the estoppel rule to the situation on the ground that the union was
clearly aware of its § 8(a) (5) rights under Snow & Sons at the time of the initial
confrontation, well before the election.
The General Counsel, in his brief to the Board in the instant case, argued that
Aiello was never meant to apply to a Snow & Sons situation:
Should the Board adopt the Trial Examiner's conclusions as to the applica-
bility of the Joy Silk Mill doctrine to the present circumstances, it is respect-
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The 1954 Aiello decision was itself a departure from established
Board doctrine. In a line of decisions beginning with M. H. Davidson
Co.,5 three years earlier, the NLRB had held that a representation election
induced solely by the employer's unlawful refusal to bargain was a nullity
because no genuine question concerning representation (the basis for a
Board-conducted election) had existed. After nullifying the objectionable
election, the Board then processed the section 8(a) (5) allegation and, if a
violation was found, ordered the employer to bargain with the union. 6
The waiver doctrine propounded in Aiello changed this procedure.7
The Board majority there reasoned along two distinct lines:
(1) The goal of a representation petition is recognition for the un-
certified union, and its basic requirement is an assertion by the union that
fully requested that the Trial Examiner's failure to draw a distinction between
cases of a Snow & Sons nature and the Joy Silk Mill type be closely
scrutinized since to apply Aiello to a Snow & Sons type case with no Joy
Silk Mill aspects clearly is an extension of the Aiello doctrine. This is true
because in a typical Joy Silk Mill case the union allegedly has a clear choice
since the acts of coercion by the employer are objective in nature. In a
Snow & Sons situation the refusal by the employer to recognize the union
is often for more subjective than objective reasons so that to charge the
union with knowledge of the employer's bad faith refusal does, in fact, place
upon the union the additional burden of being responsible for knowledge of
the offending employer's state of mind. The union under the Aiello doctrine
has already been placed in a somewhat difficult position of having to make
a determination prior to litigation of whether or not it can prove up an em-
ployer's unfair labor practices in order to support its contentions. How much
more precarious that position becomes when a union is forced to interpret
the subjective state of mind of an employer without knowledge of coercive
acts by an employer to guide its decision. For these reasons, it is respect-
fully submitted that the Board, in pronouncing the Aiello doctrine, never
intended it to be extended to cases of a Snow & Sons nature.
Brief for General Counsel, pp. 11-12.
Contrary to the trial examiner, the Board found that the employer violated
§ 8(a) (1) of the act, bringing the case under Joy Silk Mills. However, the General
Counsel's reliance on the Aiello exception in this situation, as well as his argument
against the application of Aiello in the Snow & Sons type case, became moot in view
of the Board's rejection of the entire Aiello rule.
Member Jenkins, concurring in the result, followed the argument of the General
Counsel and advocated use of the exception instead of overruling the entire doctrine.
Member Leedom, dissenting, would have dismissed the allegations.
894 N.L.R.B. 142 (1951) ; accord, Southeastern Rubber Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B.
989 (1953), enforced, 213 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1954); Dependable Mach. Co., 104
N.L.R.B. 21 (1953); Stow Mfg. Co., 103 N.L.R.B. 1280 (1953), modified, 217 F.2d
900 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 964 (1955); Model Mill Co., 103 N.L.R.B.
1527 (1953), enforced, 210 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1954); Lingerie, Inc., 101 N.L.R.B.
1374 (1952); Rehrig-Pacific Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 410 (1951); Squirrel Brand Co., 96
N.L.R.B. 179 (1951); Howell Chevrolet Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 410 (1951), enforced, 204
F2d 79 (9th Cir.), aff'd, 346 U.S. 482 (1953).
0 See, e.g., Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949), modified, 185 F.2d 732
(D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951). See generally Note, The Need
for Creative Orders Under Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, 112
U. PA. L. Rxv. 69, 83-87 (1963).
For a thorough discussion of the Aiello doctrine, see 68 HARv. L. REv. 1470
(1955).
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a question concerning representation exists.8 The refusal-to-bargain allega-
tion by an uncertified union, also seeking recognition and an order to
bargain, rests on the theory that there is no question concerning representa-
tion since the union must claim it already represents a majority of em-
ployees in an appropriate unit. The union, according to the majority in
Aiello, cannot consistently make both claims, and therefore must choose
between these paths toward the same goal.9
(2) Processing a union's section 8(a) (5) charge after it failed to
establish a majority by election would cause duplication of effort. The
election established that the union did not have a majority; a rerun election
is possible through valid objections by the union to the first election. Dis-
position of a refusal-to-bargain allegation at this stage would involve passing
again on the same question of whether or not the union had the support
of a majority of employees in the unit.10
In the present case the Board denied that the two proceedings are
"grounded in contrary assertions of fact." 1 It reasoned:
[A]lthough in filing a representation petition the union asserts
as a formal matter that a question concerning representation
exists, as a practical matter, the union has not altered its position
that it represents the employees and is entitled to recognition.
Rather it is stating the employer's assertion of such a question
and seeking an election as a means of proving that there is no
validity in that assertion.' 2
The Board also made clear that processing both petition and charge
did not create a duplication of effort. An election determines a majority
as of the day of the election but does not determine whether the union had
majority status at the time of the initial refusal to bargain. Only by
processing the section 8(a) (5) allegation can the latter determination be
made.' 3
8A union raises this question concerning representation sufficient for an election,
absent special factors, when it supplies evidence that at least 30% of the employees in
an appropriate unit want representation by the petitioner. 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (4)
(1964).
9 110 N.L.R.B. at 1368.
10 Ibid. The Board also insisted that, by delaying filing of refusal-to-bargain
charges until the election is concluded and lost, a union could circumvent the estab-
lished Board practice of declining to hold an election in the face of pending § 8(a) (5)
allegations which might render the election useless. Ibid. The Board based that
practice on the reasoning that the filing of an unfair labor practice charge moots the
petition, and, since the union claims a majority, no question concerning representation
exists to be settled by election.
31 Instant case at 4.
12 Id. at 4-5.
13 Id. at 4. The Board also reasoned that, even if there is some duplication of
effort, "considerations of economy . . . must be subordinated to the overriding policies
of the act." Id. at 7. Further, the Board emphasized that it was the employer's
unlawful conduct which exposed the union to the possibility of waiving its § 8(a) (5)
1965]
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The Board feared that a reelection would not express employee choice
of representation. 4 The statutory mandate, which is to assure to employees
"full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of repre-
sentatives of their own choosing," 15 is to be fulfilled by a secret ballot or
designation by some other method by a majority of employees in an ap-
propriate unit. In the present case the choice allegedly had been made
by a majority of employees upon signing cards authorizing the union to
act as bargaining representative. If the influence of the employer's pre-
election conduct which necessitated a reelection could be effaced from the
minds of the employees, a rerun election would reflect accurately the choice
of the employees absent the unlawful conduct.16
Where employee freedom of choice is impaired by "interference, re-
straint, or coercion violative of the Act [or] . . . other elements which
prevent or impede a reasoned choice," 17 rerun elections are held. How-
ever, the Board maintained that in the vast majority of cases the unlawful
preelection conduct effectively prevents free and reasoned choice in sub-
sequent elections, despite all precautions and delay in holding the rerun
balloting.' 8  Thus, the determination of majority status in the future by
a rerun election cannot replace a determination, by a section 8(a) (5)
proceeding, of majority status at the time of the initial refusal to recognize
and bargain. Such a spurious replacement would result from the Aiello
estoppel rule and would attenuate employee free choice.
claims. In a return to the Davidson rationale, see note 5 supra and accompanying
text, the Board held that the employer's conduct negated whatever choice the union
made in seeking recognition by a vote of the employees. The election is then declared
a nullity on the basis of sustained objections. Finally, the Board held that under
the Aiello rationale and rule a private party could, by its decision to go to election,
waive its right to prosecute a violation of the act and thus, by losing the election
and then being estopped from bringing the refusal to bargain charge, prevent the
Board from fulfilling its statutory function of effectuating employee choice of repre-
sentation. Instant case at 6, 8. The Board pointed out that the time and expense
involved in an election is much less than that in the unfair labor practice procedure.
Id. at 5, 7.
14Id. at 6.
'5 National Labor Relations Act § 1, 49 Stat. 449-50 (1935), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 151 (1958).
16 Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 223 (1962). It is through use
of § 1 of the act that the Board derives the authority to overturn elections in which,
in its estimation, employer interference or coercion has prevented expression of the
reasoned choice of the employees. Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953).
37 Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 70 (1962); see Supplemental Decision and
Order and Direction of Third Election, Sewell Mfg. Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 220 (1962).
Is Instant case at 6. The Board cites no authority for this statement. A study
made during 1962 by a special assistant to Chairman McCulloch, Pollitt, NLRB
Re-Run Elections: A Study, 41 N.C.L. Rrv. 209 (1963), shows that during the
three-year period studied (fiscal years 1960, 1961, and the first nine months of fiscal
1962) 20,153 elections were conducted, with 1,876 of these subject to objections. Of
this number 315 objections were sustained and 267 rerun elections held. Employer
misconduct was the cause for 212 of the reruns. The objecting union won 30% of
the 212, picking up an average of slightly over 20% of the total votes cast. Counting
all rerun elections, there was an overall net increase of 2% in prounion votes. These
statistics fall short of supporting the Board's strong statement, but it seems unlikely
that the effects of the employer's unlawful interference can often be dissipated before
the rerun election is held.
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This reasoning may not require that the alternative be available where
the employer denies recognition in bad faith or demands an election without
factual basis for his disbelief of the union's majority claim, but thereafter
engages in no conduct warranting nullification of the election which the
union loses. It can be argued as a matter of policy that an employer should
have some opportunity to discuss the question of union membership with
his employees, an opportunity which is denied if he is required immediately
to recognize the union when confronted with an unexpected demand for
recognition after a whirlwind or unnoticed organizational campaign. On
the other hand, the employer's refusal to recognize and bargain when
initially requested may itself dissipate the union's support so that, by the
time of the balloting, the union loses its majority. To be consistent with
its holding finding section 8(a) (5) violations in situations of bad-faith
refusal followed by no further unlawful conduct 1 9 the Board should apply
Bernel Foam and sustain the refusal-to-bargain allegation under these cir-
cumstances as well as in situations involving unlawful interrogation or
coercion during the preelection campaign.
Furthermore, the Board's hesitation to rely upon an election in lieu
of a section 8(a) (5) proceeding is attributable to its increasing awareness
of the uncertainty inherent in election procedure rules 20 and the oppor-
tunity for sophisticated near-illegal tactics in preelection maneuvers. 21 The
Board's dilemma in formulating guidelines for preelection conduct is illus-
trated by its experience with the problems of "free speech" in election
campaigns 2 and with employer interrogation of employees concerning
19 See note 4 supra.
20 See, e.g., Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962) ; S. I. Kress & Co.,
137 N.L.R.B. 1244 (1962), enforcement denied, 317 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1963) ; Blue
Flash Express Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 591 (1954).
21 Movies staged by professional actors depicting union violence and tactics have
been a favorite employer anti-union weapon. Use of them was held to be a coercive,
unlawful interference with the employees' rights of self-organization and choice of
representation under the circumstances in Ideal Baking Co., 143 N.L.R.B. 546 (1963) ;
Industrial Steel Prods. Co., 143 N.L.R.B. 336 (1963) ; Storkline Corp., 142 N.L.R.B.
875 (1963) ; Carl T. Mason Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 480 (1963) ; and Plochman & Harri-
son (Cherry Lane Foods, Inc.), 140 N.L.R.B. 130 (1962). Although all these cases in-
volved films found to be unlawful, it is likely that employers will continue this method
of preelection campaigning, simply using less inflammatory films.
22 See generally Christensen, Free Speech, Propaganda, and the National Labor
Relations Act, 38 N.Y.U.L. RE-v. 243 (1963) ; Free Speech Under the National Labor
Relations Act, Address by Assistant General Counsel Elihu Platt, Society for Ad-
vancement of Management Seminar, in Asheville, North Carolina, March 19, 1964,
in 55 L.R.R.M. 105 (1964). An example of the particular difficulty in this area of
free speech is the Board's attempts to enforce a balance between opportunities for
the employer to address his employees on company time and property and similar
opportunities permitted the union. Disregard by the Board of reversals by appellate
courts and modifications in its "no-solicitation" and "no-distribution" formulations
have placed both unions and employers in difficult and uncertain positions in the
conduct of their election campaigns. Compare May Dep't Stores Co., 316 F.2d 797
(6th Cir. 1963), reversing 136 N.L.R.B. 797 (1962), with Montgomery Ward Co.,
145 N.L.RB. No. 88 (January 7, 1964). Compare Walton Mfg. Co., 126 N.L.R.B.
697 (1960), enforced, 289 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1961), with Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co.,
138 N.L.R.B. 615 (1962). For the state of the law in the area, see United Aircraft
Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 39 (1962), enforced, 324 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1963). The develop-
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their union allegiances.2 3 Realization of these difficulties had led the Board
to scrutinize carefully conduct surrounding recognitional demands and
representation elections in order to maximize expression and fulfillment
of employee choice and translate it into a stable bargaining relationship.
23
The present decision advances the Board's movement toward its goal
of maintaining "laboratory conditions" 25 as the proper atmosphere for
employee choice of representation. By "laboratory conditions" is meant
preelection conduct by both the union and the employer such that when the
employees express their choice, it will be an uninhibited and reasoned one.
As a result of the opportunity which the present decision gives the union
to file section 8(a) (5) charges subsequent to the election, the employer
now has less to gain from election interference.
Bernel Foam has precipitated a need for the Board to reexamine its
policy for handling situations involving section 8(a) (5) charges and peti-
tions for election or objections to the conduct of an election pending at the
same time. Since a union may file refusal-to-bargain charges subsequent
to losing an election, the Board need not adhere to its policy 26 of refusing
to conduct an election, be it initial or rerun, while such charges are pending.
Certainly, if the union can choose to go to election with knowledge of the
section 8(a) (5) violations, the actual filing of those charges should not
change the procedure. The Board's denial of the theoretical inconsistency
between these two proceedings toward the same goal seems to abrogate the
previous doctrine. In consideration of the shorter time and smaller expense
ment of the shifting no-solicitation and no-distribution doctrines is discussed in Note,
112 U. PA. L. REv. 1049 (1964). Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953),
requires a halt to all oral communication on company time from the parties to massed
groups of employees concerning the approaching election 24 hours prior to the ballot-
ing, but permits distribution of written and visual propaganda right up to the time of
the voting.
23 See S. H. Kress & Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1244 (1962), enforcement denied, 317
F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1963); Guild Indust. Mfg. Corp., 133 N.L.R.B. 1719 (1961),
order amended, 135 N.L.R.B. 971 (1962), modified, 321 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1963);
Blue Flash Express Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 591 (1954) (formulating requirements for
lawful interrogation by an employer).
24 The decision in the instant case brings the Board's practice with respect to
refusal-to-bargain allegations based on preelection conduct substantially into line with
its procedure in disposing of objections to an election based on conduct occurring
during the preelection period. Prior to 1961 a union waived its right to assert, as
the basis for setting aside an election, employer conduct which occurred prior to
execution of a consent election agreement or, in a contested case, prior to issuance
of the Board's decision and direction of election. See F. W. Woolworth Co., 109
N.L.R.B. 1446 (1954). Landmarks in the development of this rule were Great At.
& Pac. Tea Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1118 (1952), and Denton Sleeping Garment Mills,
Inc., 93 N.L.R.B. 329 (1951). After the Board delegated decisional authority in
election cases to the regional directors, 26 Fed. Reg. 3911 (1961), the time between
filing of the petition and election was substantially decreased, enabling the Board to
move the cut-off period for employer conduct which may be used in postelection
objections back to the date of filing the petition. Ideal Elec. & Mfg. Co., 134 N.L.
R.B. 1275 (1961). This liberalization resulting in discard of the estoppel rule in
objections to elections was only briefly mentioned in the instant case. Instant case
at 8 n.5.
25 General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948). The goal of laboratory
conditions was reaffirmed in Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962).
26 Instant case at 4, 7.
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involved in the election procedure,27 the union should be allowed to use this
alternative if it wishes. If the union feels that it could not establish its
majority in the atmosphere tainted by the employer's unlawful conduct, the
representation petition could be withdrawn or dismissed, pending disposi-
tion of the section 8(a) (5) charges. This was the procedure prior to
Aiello; 28 a return to it now is warranted.
The present decision will have a far-reaching effect upon the employer-
employee relationship. Now that the union has "two bites at the apple"
in its quest for recognition, interference by the employer with the em-
ployees' freedom of choice will be discouraged,2 9 while independent recog-
nition and voluntary bargaining will be encouraged. Elections will be used
initially to a much greater extent and many section 8(a) (5) proceedings
will be obviated by successful elections, since the union is secure in the
Imowledge that it can still assert its refusal to bargain charge if the election
is lost.30 The employer's lawful economic leverage and opportunity to
influence his employees in their choice of collective-bargaining representa-
tive 31 will be subject to the new countervailing power of the union's dual
approaches to its goal.
At the same time, the present decision encourages the use of au-
thorization cards by a union in pressing its demand for recognition upon
an employer. This places a greater responsibility upon the Board to de-
termine the validity of these cards when used by a union to establish its
majority standing as a basis for its section 8(a) (5) allegation. The Board
has been grappling with the issue of the authenticity of union authorization
cards in this context for several years.3 2  Authenticity and date of signa-
ture, representations as to the purpose of the card by the union organizer
27The time required to process representation cases from filing of petition to
issuance of decision was 39 days in fiscal year 1963. The median time in fiscal year
1962 was 41 days, 28 NLRB ANN. REP. 17 (1963). In fiscal year 1963 the median
time from the filing of an unfair labor practice charge to issuance of complaint in
instances of meritorious charges was 49 days. Id. at 10. From complaint through
hearing to trial examiner's decision averages approximately four to six months. If
an appeal to the Board is taken, an additional year can elapse before determination
of the case. From the Board's order there may be an appeal to the appropriate court
of appeals, further lengthening the time before final disposition of the case. The
expense is commensurate with the length of time consumed in the process and the
adversary nature of the proceeding. Both of these considerations are absent in a
representation proceeding since, in most cases, hearings to determine date of election,
unit involved, polling place, lists of eligible voters, and other matters are quickly
settled.
28 See, e.g., Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949), vmodified, 185 F.2d
732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951).
2 9 Instant case at 6.
30 Ibid.
31 judge Learned Hand spoke of this natural advantage of the employer when
addressing his employees: "[O]n the one hand it is an expression of his own beliefs
and an attempt to persuade his employees to accept them; on the other, it is an indi-
cation of his feelings which his hearers may believe will take a form inimical to those
of whom he does not succeed in convincing." NLRB v. American Tube Bending
Co., 134 F.2d 993, 994 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 768 (1943).
32 See Dan River Mills, Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. 645 (1958), modified, 274 F.2d 381
(5th Cir. 1960) ; A. L. Gilbert Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 2067 (1954) ; Brown Truck Mfg.
Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 999 (1953).
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to the alleged signer, purpose of the card as shown on its face, and repudia-
tions of the card through testimony at the hearing become acute problems
requiring Board attention and rulings. There are indications that the
Board realizes the pressing nature of the problem and the need to promul-
gate policies for the union's use of authorization cards.
3 3
OBSCENITY-JRY GivEN CHALLENGED Booxs To READ
SILENTLY IN OPEN COURT OVER DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TiAT
PROCEDURE WAS DENIAL OF PUBLIC TRIAL
Defendants, on trial for allegedly mailing and transporting obscene
books interstate,' moved to have the challenged books read aloud to the
331n a recent decision, Imco Container Co., 146 N.L.R.B. No. 32 (August 14,
1964), the Board upheld the trial examiner's ruling permitting the employer to
remove the union's authorization cards from the hearing room and conduct an ex
parte investigation concerning their authenticity by individual interviews at the em-
ployer's plant. Stressing the fact that ten of thirteen employees who testified at
the hearing had repudiated the cards alleged by the union to bear their signatures,
the Board stated that such a procedure expedited the hearing and avoided the expense
of an adjournment.
This procedure involves serious problems. It gives the employer tempting oppor-
tunities to engage in unlawful conduct such as threats and promises of benefit for
repudiation of the union. Even if the employer's conduct is actually unimpeachable,
union allegations of violations are likely. Such allegations would complicate the
hearing, which already has been disrupted by the ex parte proceeding. More prac-
ticable would be authentication through pretrial conferences specifically on the issue
of the validity of the authorization cards through which the union is attempting to
establish its majority. Selection of a hearing officer might prove difficult, since the
NLRB's regional office is a party to the proceeding, and the trial examiner is tra-
ditionally not known to any party until the hearing commences. However, the trial
examiner would be a logical person to preside at this pretrial conference, held immedi-
ately before the actual hearing.
After this comment went to press, the Board applied the Bernel Foam rule in
the case of Irving Air Chute Co., 149 N.L.R.B. No. 59 (Nov. 12, 1964), but stated
in dictum that it would not issue an order to bargain as remedy for a § 8(a) (5)
violation "unless the election be set aside upon meritorious objections filed in the
representation case." 149 N.L.R.B. No. 59, at 4. The implications of this dictum
are unclear. The Board may hold that proof of a § 8(a) (5) violation, in the form
of objections to the election, is not per se sufficient to invalidate the election. Such
a holding, combined with the dictum in Irving Air Chute, would significantly limit
the substantive effect of Bernel Foam. If proof of the § 8(a) (5) violation would
be sufficient in itself to set the election aside, the dictum merely means that, in order
to have its § 8(a) (5) charge heard, the union must follow the procedural step of
filing an objection to the election within five days rather than having the normal
six months in which to file an unfair labor practice charge. This rule has the virtue
of ensuring that, once the five days pass without objections being filed, the parties
can rely upon the election results as determinative of the union's claim to representation.
On the other hand, the burden which this decision places upon a union, which will
often enter into an election without aid of counsel, is substantial. To alleviate this
effect, the Board may be forced to resurrect something like the old exception to
the Aiello rule and allow the union to raise the § 8(a) (5) claim when the violation
occurs close to the date of the election, even though the union fails to file timely
objections.
1 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461-62 (1958). The statutes provide that anyone who uses
the mails or any express company or common carrier for delivery of "any obscene,
lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, motion-picture film, paper, letter,
writing, print, or other matter of indecent character . . ." shall be fined up to
$5,000 or imprisoned up to five years or both for a first offense and fined up to
$10,000 or imprisoned up to ten years or both for each subsequent offense.
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jury 2 in open court. The district court denied defendants' motion and
instead submitted the books to be read silently by each member of the jury
in open court at the end of the prosecution's evidence. On posttrial mo-
tions, defendants contended that the court's procedure deprived them of
their constitutional right to a public trial. The district court denied the
motions, holding that the public trial requirements were fully satisfied since
the books were submitted to the jury in the presence of the defendants.
United States v. West Coast News Co., 228 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Mich.
1964).
Before the Supreme Court's enunciation of the obscenity test in Roth
v. United States,3 presentation of challenged material to the jury was little
problem. Where the obscenity of any portion of the work was sufficient
to condemn the whole, 4 the prosecution would read allegedly obscene pas-
sages to the jury, after which the defense would read innocent, offsetting
passages.5 Since the Roth decision, courts have submitted challenged
material to the jury to be read silently.8 Although the use of this pro-
cedure has been considered within the sound discretion of the trial court,7
2 The question whether a criminal trial by jury is the proper method for de-
termining the obscenity of a book is beyond the scope of this comment. As Mr.
Chief Justice Warren pointed out, concurring in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
495 (1957), "It is not the book that is on trial; it is a person. The conduct of the
defendant is the central issue, not the obscenity of a book or picture." But insofar
as obscenity may be considered an issue of fact relevant to defendant's guilt, it is
proper, and even necessary, that it be decided by the jury. See Zeitlin v. Arnebergh,
59 Cal. 2d 901, 908 n.11, 383 P.2d 152, 157 n.11, 31 Cal. Rptr. 800, 805 n.11 (1963).
However, the question of obscenity more properly involves mixed questions of law
and fact, id. at 910, 383 P.2d at 158, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 806, and may "not really
[be] an issue of fact but a question of constitutional judgment of the most sensitive
and delicate kind." Roth v. United States, supra at 498 (Harlan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Thus appellate courts have generally exercised a broad
scope of review on the obscenity issue, frequently overturning lower court findings.
E.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (opinion of Brennan, J.); Manual
Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 488 (1962) (opinion of Harlan, J.); Grove
Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 276 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1960); Zeitlin v. Arnebergh,
59 Cal. 2d 901, 383 P.2d 152, 31 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1963); see Sunshine Book Co. v.
Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958), reversing per curiam 249 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir.
1957) ; One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958), reversing per curiam 241 F.2d 772
(9th Cir. 1957); Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 35, reversing per
curiam 244 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1957). See generally Lockhart & McClure, Censor-
ship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5,
114-20 (1960). The right to have a jury make the initial determination is still
important since, if the jury finds as a fact that the challenged material was not
obscene, the defendant is acquitted, and there is no need to face the first amendment
question.
3 354 U.S. 476 (1957). The test is "whether, to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole appeals to prurient interest." Id. at 489.
4United States v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913); United States v.
Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas. 1093 (No. 14571) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879); Commonwealth v.
Friede, 271 Mass. 318, 171 N.E. 472 (1930).
5 Burton v. United States, 142 Fed. 57 (8th Cir. 1906); Commonwealth v.
Friede, supra note 4; cf. United States v. Bennett, supra note 4.
6Alexander v. United States, 271 F.2d 140 (8th Cir. 1959). The court in
Yudkin v. State, 229 Md. 223, 225, 182 A.2d 798, 800 (1962), did not have the issue
before it, but indicated that this was the procedure followed.
7 See Alexander v. United States, supra note 6; Winters v. United States, 201
Fed. 845 (8th Cir. 1912).
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the constitutional question of right to public trial has never before been
raised in such a context.
The purposes of public trial are said to include the stimulation of
conscientiousness in judge and jury8 through the force of "contempora-
neous review in the forum of public opinion," o the tendency to produce
more trustworthy testimony,10 and the likelihood of bringing the case to
the attention of persons, unknown to the parties, who may have important
information." In general these safeguards to defendant's rights would
be adequately guaranteed simply by admitting the public to the trial and
allowing them to hear the issues involved.' 2 The only special advantage
to be gained by publicity of the specific contents of an exhibit such as the
challenged book might be to render the judge and jury more conscientious
and, thus, to protect against the conviction of a defendant for shipping an
innocent but little-known book.
But even granting that the defendant has an interest in having the
public know specifically the details of the material being tested, the addi-
tional information the public would obtain from a reading aloud of the
challenged books would be almost negligible. The titles of the books are
introduced into evidence and testimony both on their literary merit and
on the community standards brings out the flavor of the material, if not a
good many details as well. It is unlikely that spectators listening to the
material being read aloud would retain much more than this sort of general
impression.' 3 These considerations may well have influenced the court in
Gillars v. U-nited States ' to hold that publicity of an exhibit was not
necessary to satisfy the sixth amendment's guarantee of public trial. There,
electronic recordings of defendant's allegedly treasonous broadcasts were
8 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1834 (3d ed. 1940).
9 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948).
10 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1834 (3d ed. 1940).
11 Ibid.
'2 There is the further question of whether the public has a right to be admitted
to trials. Compare E. W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App. 157, 125 N.E.2d 896,
appeal dismissed as moot, 164 Ohio St. 261, 130 N.E.2d 701 (1955) (upholding
public's right), with United Press Ass'ns v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777
(1954) (no right of public). See generally Fair Trial and Freedom of the Press,
19 F.R.D. 16 (1955). Wigmore suggests that there may be such a right, designed
both to educate the public and to bring the case to the attention of parties whose
interests may be affected. 6 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 1834 (3d ed. 1940). Even if
the right does exist, it is doubtful that the defendant would have standing to chal-
lenge its denial. Cf. E. W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, supra at 168-69, 125 N.E.2d at
904; Lysles v. State, 330 P.2d 734, 747 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958) (Powell, J., con-
curring) (defendant may not waive public's right).
Furthermore, it cannot be argued that the sixth amendment is peculiarly appro-
priate to protect first amendment freedoms, since many determinations of obscenity
are made in noncriminal proceedings where the sixth amendment is inapplicable. See,
e.g., Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962); Parmelee v. United
States, 113 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1940); CoNN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 53-244(b) (Supp.
1963).
13 Since spectators are not charged with any duty to pay close attention, the chance
of their being confused might be so great as to diminish substantially their function
as a check on the operation of the judicial process.
14 182 F2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
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played to the jury, the court, and opposing counsel through earphones-
six sets of earphones being provided for the spectators. The court stated
that the trial was "public" since there was no secrecy and "no exclusion
from public knowledge of all that transpired," '5 even though not all the
spectators were able to hear the recordings. This rationale was later
applied in an identical situation where no earphones were provided for the
spectators, 16 and seems to have been the basis for another court's justifica-
tion for its ability to exclude the public from a courtroom showing of an
allegedly obscene film.1
7
Aside from the question whether the public would gain anything from
hearing the material read aloud, such publicity is undesirable in that it may
circumvent the purpose of the obscenity statutes to keep obscene material
from the public.1 8 Furthermore, it is the principal function of the trial
to obtain a jury determination of the book as it was written, and a court
official reading the material aloud could not avoid the addition, at least to
some extent, of his own inflection to the material. Since it is the obscenity
of the book itself which is in issue, not the obscenity of the book as read
aloud by one particular person, such an addition seems impermissible.19
Finally, the Supreme Court in Roth urged great care in the determination
of obscenity. 20 Thus a jury should have as clear an understanding as
possible of the challenged material. Reading aloud may not be conducive
to such a clear understanding, since even a normal speed of reading may be
so fast that some jurors may have difficulty in comprehending the material.
21
Granting that it would be more desirable for each juror to read the
material silently, there is still the possibility of jury confusion, since some
members of the jury may, due to a lack of reading ability, be unable to
determine the dominant theme of the challenged material or to understand
it well enough to appraise any comparison material which might be sub-
15 Id. at 978.
16 D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338, 365 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 935 (1952).
17 Lancaster v. United States, 293 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1961). In Lancaster, as
well as in Gillars and D'Aquino, the defendant was provided the protection of dis-
closure of the exhibit to the press. A further protection against an unfair finding of
obscenity is the broad scope of appellate review of the issue. See cases cited note 2
supra.
18 It has been held that exclusion of the public from a trial for rape on the
ground that its presence would embarrass a mature witness was a denial of defendant's
presumption of innocence. See Tanksley v. United States, 145 F.2d 58 (9th Cir.
1944). It should be noted, however, that the mere presentation of books for silent
reading is bound to have a lesser impact on the jury than the clearing of the court-
room after argument on the embarrassment issue and will consequently have a less
prejudicial effect.
19 Where the challenged material consists of recordings or recorded readings,
an entirely different problem is raised, for there the material in question is the work
as presented on the recording, and the rendition is relevant to a determination of the
obscenity issue.
20 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488 (1957).
21 This factor was considered by the present court. Instant case at 178. The
problem could perhaps be overcome through the use of individual readers. But the
benefits of reading aloud would hardly justify the inconvenience, confusion, and
expense.
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mitted. 22 This problem cannot be solved by providing assistance to the
poor readers, since a jury cannot receive communications of any kind
relative to the case except in open court.2
One possible solution would be to use a jury specially selected for its
ability to read and comprehend at something above a minimum level.
While the sixth amendment's mandate for an impartial jury requires a
cross-section of the community to be represented,24 it does not demand that
the cross-section be absolute,25 but only that there be no systematic exclu-
sion of any "group" 26 on the basis of such criteria as race, occupational
background, religion, sex, or social or economic class.27 Determination of
whether or not systematic exclusion is permissible seems to be based on
the proposition of reasonableness: a jury selection is impartial unless ex-
clusion of a group is "not based on some reasonable classification." 28 Ap-
parently following this rationale, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit in United States v. Henderson 2 upheld consideration of spelling,
grammar, penmanship, and degree of education in selecting jurors. "De-
fendant," the court said, "has no constitutional or statutory right that
'ignorance' be represented in the jury box." 30 In an earlier decision 31
Judge Learned Hand, upholding a jury-selection process which relied, in
part, upon voting lists and names submitted by private organizations, drew
an analogy from the assumption that a properly selected jury "might be one
subjected to an intelligence test." 32 Thus it would appear that no con-
22 Such material was ruled admissible in the instant case, but the court refused
to qualify the books offered. Instant case at 191-99. Comparison material was thought
admissible by Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147,
169-72 (1959), and by the court in Yudkin v. State, 229 Md. 223, 229-30, 182 A.2d
798, 802 (1962).
23 Wheaton v. United States, 133 F.2d 522 (8th Cir. 1943) (bailiff communi-
cation); Smith v. Shankman, 208 Cal. App. 2d 177, 25 Cal. Rptr. 195 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1962) (same); Rocky Mountain Trucking Co. v. Taylor, 79 Wyo. 461, 335
P.2d 448 (1959) (dictum) (censuring use of dictionary as "highly improper"); see
Briggs v. United States, 221 F.2d 636 (6th Cir. 1955).
24 Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 85 (1942) ; see The Jury System in the
Federal Courts, 26 F.R.D. 409, 418 (1960); cf. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130
(1940).
25United States v. Henderson, 298 F.2d 522, 525 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 878 (1962).
26 Dow v. Carnegie-Ill. Steel Corp., 224 F2d 414 (3d Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 971 (1956); United States v. Flynn, 106 F. Supp. 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1952),
aff'd, 216 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 909 (1955) ; United States
v. Frankfeld, 101 F. Supp. 449 (D. Md. 1951), aff'd on other grounds, 198 F.2d 679
(4th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 922 (1953).2 7 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (race); Ballard v. United States,
329 U.S. 187 (1946) (sex) ; United States v. Flynn, supra note 26, at 980.
28 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954).
29298 F.2d 522 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 878 (1962).
30 Id. at 526. But see United States v. Kline, 221 F. Supp. 776, 784 (D. Minn.
1963).
31 United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd on other grounds,
341 U.S. 494 (1951).
3
2 Id. at 222. Judge Hand relied on Fay v. New York, 322 U.S. 261 (1947),
in which the Supreme Court held valid a state provision for the use of "high intelli-
gence" juries in particularly important or intricate cases. As to the more stringent
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stitutional difficulties would be posed in the use of a special obscenity jury
unless the standard of comprehension were set so high that its rational
basis were destroyed.3 3 The proposed procedure would go no further
than the application of a limited reading comprehension test, which might
be chosen from any number of standardized examinations 4 Such a test
would be administered to the available jurors prior to the voir dire, and
only those who displayed sufficient reading skill would be eligible to serve
on the obscenity jury.
Whether the use of a special jury violates the Roth requirement that
challenged material be tested against contemporary community standards
depends upon whether or not the jury is considered the "embodiment"
of these standards. If the jury is so considered,35 it would seem that
the degree to which community standards were accurately reflected would
depend upon whether the jury represented as complete a cross-section
of the community as possible. But if the jury is not considered the
embodiment of community standards, but rather is to gain its information
solely from external evidence, the accuracy of its determination would
not depend upon its being representative.3 6 At least two considerations
point to the latter conclusion. First, the standards to be applied are
requirements placed on the federal courts by the sixth amendment, Judge Hand said:
"It has been decided over and over again that by [the sixth amendment] . . . we
incorporated [jury trial] . . . as we inherited it, and we have shown that the com-
position of the list did not diverge from what had been the accepted practice."
United States v. Dennis, supra note 31, at 223.
33 The rational basis for the use of special jurors in these cases is that jurors
unable to read or comprehend the challenged material could not make a fair deter-
rmination of obscenity under Roth. Obviously the degree of skill required would vary
with the difficulty of the book in question. Thus the use of a jury of extremely high
reading ability could be justified if the book were extremely complicated; but the
rationality of the use of such a jury would disappear if the book were of the common
newsstand variety. Then exclusion of racial, social, or other groups resulting from
selection on the basis of reading ability, immaterial in the former case, see Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 473 (1953), would probably be fatal, see Hernandez v. Texas, 347
U.S. 475 (1954). For this reason it would be wise to set a fairly low standard, even
though it may not provide a jury competent to understand an extremely complicated
work.
3 4 E.g., EDUCATIONAL TESTING SERvlcE, CooPm.Rrxvz ENGLISH TESTS (1960);
GIBERT, READING SURVEY (1958). Both test vocabulary, speed and accuracy of
comprehension, and level of comprehension. See also Note, 5 STAN. L. REV. 247,
260 & nn.82 & 83 (1953) ; Note, Psychological Tests and Standards of Competence
for Selecting Jurors, 65 YALE L.J. 531, 533 (1956). See generally Redmount, Psy-
chological Tests for Selecting Jurors, 5 KAN. L. REV. 391 (1957).
35 This is the view seemingly adopted by the present court. Instant case at 183.
But see id. at 188. There are indications that other courts have taken this position.
See Kahm v. United States, 300 F.2d 78, 84 (5th Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 859 (1962) ; United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1936) (L. Hand, J.).
In United States v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913), the court stated
that "a jury should in each case establish the standard much as they do in cases of
negligence. . . . [T]hey must be free to follow the colloquial connotations which
they have drawn up instinctively from life and common speech."
36 It is possible that a jury of somewhat skilled readers, even if not considered
the embodiment of community standards, would tend not to give sufficient weight to
the views of less literate segments of society when determining those standards.
But it must be assumed that the jury will follow its instructions and apply the
standards of the whole community.
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national rather than local, 37 and it would be difficult to view a jury "of
the State and district" 38 as the embodiment of national standards. Second,
authority indicating that evidence on community standards should be
heard 3 9 argues against viewing the jury as the embodiment of these stand-
ards, since it would seem improper for them to hear evidence which might
only tend to lead them away from that which they should know intuitively.4 °
For Roth purposes, then, it would seem unnecessary to have a representa-
tive jury.41
Even a special jury, reading the challenged material silently, might be
confused and unable intelligently to determine a dominant theme if the
material were extremely complex.4 In such cases it would appear logical
to permit expert testimony directed toward illumination of this theme.43
Although it may be questioned whether such testimony is admissible since
it may invade the province of the jury by presenting a conclusion on an
3 7 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (opinion of Brennan, J.); Manual
Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 488 (1962) (opinion of Harlan, J.); Smith v.
California, 361 U.S. 147, 165 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ; State v. Hudson
County News Co., 41 N.J. 247, 196 A.2d 225 (1963) (reversible error to admit evi-
dence of local standards); MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.4 (4) (d) (Proposed Official
Draft 1962) ; Lockhart & McClure, supra note 2, at 108-12. In facobellis there was
no opinion of the Court, but only Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Clark
disagreed on this point.
38 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
39 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 160-66, 169-72 (1959) (separate opinions);
In re Harris, 56 Cal. 2d 879, 366 P.2d 305, 16 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1961); Yudkin v.
State, 229 Md. 223, 182 A.2d 798 (1962); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. §53-244(g)
(Supp. 1963); MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.4(4) (d) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
40 Mr. Justice Frankfurter has stated that due process requires evidence on com-
munity standards:
Since the law through its functionaries is "applying contemporary community
standards" in determining what constitutes obscenity . . . it surely must be
deemed rational, and therefore relevant to the issue of obscenity, to allow light
to be shed on what those "contemporary community standards" are. Their
interpretation ought not to depend solely on the necessarily limited, hit-or-niss,
subjective view of what they are believed to be by the individual juror or
judge. It bears repetition that the determination of obscenity is for juror or
judge not on the basis of his personal upbringing or restricted reflection or
particular experience of life, but on the basis of "contemporary community
standards."
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 165 (1959) (concurring opinion). (Emphasis
added.)
41 The contention suggested by Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Kingsley
Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 448 (1957), that the reference to "the average
person" in the Roth definition of obscenity requires a representative jury is untenable.
In Roth the Court was dealing with the standard by which obscenity is to be deter-
mined-appeal to the prurient interest of the average man as opposed to that of
abnormal persons, see Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962) (material
appealing to homosexuals not obscene under Roth); City of Newark v. Licht, 83
N.J. Super. 499, 200 A.2d 508 (App. Div. 1964) (same)-not with the instrumentality
by which the standard is to be applied. Cf. Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, 59 Cal. 2d 901,
911, 383 P.2d 152, 158, 31 Cal. Rptr. 800, 806 (1963). If the Roth decision meant
that the average person must actually apply the test, it would have demanded jury
trial in all obscenity proceedings, administrative and civil, as well as criminal.
Clearly there is no such requirement See note 12 supra.
4 2 See note 33 supra.
43 The general rule is that expert testimony is admissible when the subject
"requires that the court and jury have the aid of knowledge or experience such as
men not specially skilled do not have." 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 502
CASE COMMENTS
ultimate issue, 4 the jury is free to disbelieve the expert 45 and decide for
itself the dominant theme of the material. Therefore, the court, in its dis-
cretion, should admit such evidence if it believes it would aid the jury.46
Although order of proof is within the discretion of the trial court,47
the jury should read the challenged material at a time likely to produce
as little confusion or prejudice as possible. Several considerations may be
advanced to establish guidelines in determining the best time for reading
in a given case. As the present court pointed out, reading during delibera-
tion deprives the jury of familiarity with the material when hearing testi-
mony relating thereto and when it is instructed on the issue of obscenity.48
Thus reading at that time may deprive the jury of a clear understanding
of all the evidence.49 When the testimony becomes so specific that in the
court's discretion the jury cannot adequately understand it without having
read the material, the jury should read the material before further evidence
is introduced.50
Since order of proof may have a substantial effect on the jury's deci-
sion,5 1 a reading after only the prosecution's evidence on the material has
been heard may be prejudicial to the defendant. That procedure may invite
the jury to place undue emphasis on the factors leading to a conclusion of
(12th ed. 1955) ; see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Payne Oil Corp., 146 F.2d 546 (10th
Cir. 1944) ; cf. Yudkin v. State, 229 Md. 223, 228, 182 A.2d 798, 801 (1962) (whether
jury will be helped, not whether it could decide without aid). Further, literary
analysis is a proper subject for expert testimony. See Yudkin v. State, supra at
227, 182 A.2d at 801; Lockhart & McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity, and
the Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REV. 295, 348 (1954).
44 The present court indicated at one point that such testimony would be offensive
on these grounds. Instant case at 182 citing United States v. Spaulding, 293 U.S.
498 (1935) and United States v. Sauls, 65 F.2d 886 (4th Cir. 1933).
45 Millar v. Tropical Gables Corp., 99 So. 2d 589, 590 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1958);
North v. State, 65 So. 2d 77, 87 (Fla. App. 1952); Shutka v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
74 N.J. Super. 381, 400, 181 A.2d 400, 410 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 38 N.J. 183,
183 A2d 88 (1962).
46 This is in accord with the present trend against the "ultimate issue" doctrine.
See Oxenberg v. State, 362 P2d 893 (Alaska), appeal dismissed and cert. denied,
368 U.S. 56 (1961); Millar v. Tropical Gables Corp., 99 So. 2d 589 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1958); Shutka v. Pennsylvania R.R., 74 N.J. Super. 381, 181 A.2d 400 (App.
Div.), cert. denied, 38 N.J. 183, 183 A.2d 88 (1962); UNIFORm RULE oF EVIDENCE
56(4) ; MODEL CODE oF EVIDENCE rule 401(1) (1942) ; N.J. SUPREmE CoURT Comm. oN
EVimENcx REPORT 110 (1963).
47 Matz v. United States, 158 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Braatelien v. United
States, 147 F.2d 888, 893 (8th Cir. 1945) ; 6 WIGMORZ, EVIDENCE § 1867 (3d ed. 1940).
48 Instant case at 179.
49 On the other hand, the jury may take notes on the testimony and use them
later to refresh their recollection of what was said about the material. United States
v. Carlisi, 32 F. Supp. 479, 483 (E.D.N.Y. 1940) ; see Goodloe v. United States, 188
F.2d 621 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 819 (1951).50 In general the trial judge should also attempt to order the trial so that the
prosecution's evidence on issues other than obscenity is presented before reading
becomes necessary. Otherwise, the reading may be a waste of time if the prosecution
is unable to prove other elements of the offense. The prosecution apparently offered
no evidence on the obscenity issue other than the books themselves in the instant case.
See Government's Trial Brief, pp. 3-4.
51 See Weld & Roff, A Study in the Formulation of Opinion Based Upon Legal
Evidence, 51 AMEmcAN J. PsYcaoLoGy 609 (1938). As the authors point out, their
experiments were not carried out under actual courtroom conditions.
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obscenity just previously stressed by the prosecution. This prejudice is
not likely to be remedied by re-examination of the exhibit in light of the
defendant's evidence, for a second reading of the material is often imprac-
ticable. Unlike most ordinary exhibits, challenged material in obscenity
cases is often of considerable length.
WILLS-CONSIDERATION OF TAx CONSEQUENCES IN CONSTRUCTION
OF AMBIGUOUS WMILS
Many articles and books have been written to advise the prospective
will drafter in the intricacies of preparing a will such as to enable his estate
to pay the minimum amount of taxes.' One writer has even gone so far
to say that "in many respects, the art of estate planning has become
primarily the art of tax dodging." 2 Since it clearly would not be unrea-
sonable to assume, even apart from these authorities, that most testators
desire to pass on to their heirs as much of their estates as possible, it might
be anticipated that courts consider this factor in their construction of
ambiguous wills. Yet extensive research has revealed only one appellate
court case-a 1945 Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision a-that has
explicitly done so.
Courts resort to construction 4 only when they find the words of a will
ambiguous and therefore must go beyond the words themselves to find
their meaning.5 In construing contracts or deeds precedents are employed
to give meaning to the separate phrases and clauses. Wills, however, are
rarely drawn according to any set form, and a slight variation in wording
1E.g., Mackay, How the Professional Firm Should Plan for the Retirement or
Death of Partners, 11 J. TAXATION 54 (1959); Neuhoff, What To Do Before
Drafting a Will-Check List, 6 PRAC. LAw. 64 (1960); Parsons, How Specific Must
a Charitable Bequest Be To Be Deductible, N.Y.U. 16Tr INST. ON FED. TAX 923
(1958); Sargent, Marital Deductions: To Each His Own, 93 TRUSTS & ESTATES
933 (1954); Siefert, Death Taxes and Estate Planning, 18 JAG J. 207 (1964);
Walther, 13 Hints on Drafting Wills, 99 TRUSTS & ESTATES 255 (1960); Young,
Estate Planning and the Tax Structure, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 437.
2 Ibid. Another writer quite pointedly announces: "Lets face it. The thing
clients want the most is not to pay taxes . . . ." Sargent, supra note 1, at
934. The author, having some difficulty convincing an elderly woman to write a
will, tried telling her about the tax savings: "Finally I bent over her and said:
'You know this would save your estate a lot of money in taxes.' Her eyes opened,
the blood came to her cheeks, she sat up and said: 'Say that again.' The Will
somehow got executed . . . ." Ibid.
3 Harris Estate, 351 Pa. 368, 41 A.2d 715 (1945). See also Rush Estate, 6
Chester 188 (C.P. Chester County, Pa., 1954).
4There is a difference of opinion as to whether there is any difference between
"interpretation" and "construction" when used by the courts in ascertaining the
testator's intention. Compare ATKINSON, WmLs § 146, at 809 (2d ed. 1953), and
THOMPSON, WILLS § 210, at 320 (3d ed. 1947), with 2 PAGE, WILus § 915 (3d ed.
1941). This distinction, if it exists, is unimportant here and will not be considered.
5 See In re Artz' Estate, 254 Iowa 1064, 1070, 120 N.W.2d 418, 422 (1963);
In the Matter of Estate of Crossman, 39 Misc. 2d 1094, 1098, 242 N.Y.S._d 576,
580 (Surr. Ct. 1963). See generally ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note 4, § 146, at
807-08; 2 PAGE, op. cit. supra note 4, § 916, at 794-99; THomPsoN, op. cit. supra
note 4, § 211, at 324.
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may evidence a radically different intention.6 Courts have developed a set
of "canons" or rules of construction to use instead of precedent in resolving
ambiguities.7  These canons are broad general guides to which the courts
look in determining which of two or more possible meanings to give the
words in a will. They are essentially a compilation of the general motivat-
ing considerations which experience has shown most probably controlled a
testator's specific distribution. Their use is an attempt to place the court
"in the armchair of the testator," 8 so that it may as nearly as possible
find the intent of the particular testator when he wrote his wilL9
Since minimization of the tax burden is likely to be an important
element of the intent, a court construing a will can presume that its
writer had this intent.' Such a presumption would often mesh neatly
6 Two individuals may use the same phrase but intend completely different
meanings. See Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Robert, 36 N.J. 561, 568, 178 A.2d 185, 189
(1962). See generally 2 PAGE, op. cit. supra note 4, § 917; THomirsox, op. cit. supra
note 4, § 212.
7 Some of the most common rules are the consideration of the testator's sur-
rounding circumstances, Osburn v. Murphy, 193 N.E.2d 669, 671 (Ind. 1963);
Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Robert, 36 N.J. 561, 565, 178 A.2d 185, 187 (1962) ; the
ascertainment of intention from the will as a whole and not from disjointed frag-
ments, In the Matter of Spross, 37 Misc. 2d 581, 583, 236 N.Y.S.2d 666, 669
(Surr. Ct. 1963); In re Valiquette's Estate, 122 Vt. 362, 364, 173 A.2d 839, 842
(1961) ; control of a general intention over any particular intent when these con-
flict, Taylor v. Rapp, 217 Ga. 654, 656, 124 S.E.2d 271, 272 (1962) ; In the Matter
of Fabbri, 2 N.Y.2d 236, 240, 140 N.E.2d 269, 271, 159 N.Y.S.2d 184, 188 (1957);
presumption against an unjust or absurd intention, it re Zang's Estate, 123 N.W.2d
883, 885 (Iowa 1963); First Camden Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Broadbent, 66
N.J. Super. 199, 205, 168 A.2d 677, 680 (Ch. 1961); presumption that intention is
in accordance with the law, Poindexter v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 258 N.C.
371, 377, 128 S.E.2d 867, 872 (1963); Jones Estate, 29 Pa. D. & C.2d 437, 456, 190
A.2d 120, 131 (Orphans' Ct. Allegheny County 1962), aff'd, 410 Pa. 380, 190 A.2d
120 (1963); presumption against partial or complete intestacy, In the Matter of
Wissman, 38 Misc. 2d 39, 40, 237 N.Y.S.2d 730, 732 (Surr. Ct. 1963) ; It re Wilson's
Will, 260 N.C. 482, 484, 133 S.E.2d 189, 191 (1963) ; presumption in favor of heirs
at law, Clayton v. James B. Clow & Sons, 212 F. Supp. 482, 504 (N.D. Ill. 1962) ;
It re Lester's Estate, 191 Kan. 83, 87, 379 P.2d 275, 278 (1963) ; presumption that
the testator intended that which is necessarily implied by the words of the will,
Weir v. Leafgreen, 26 Ill. 2d 406, 411, 186 N.E.2d 293, 296 (1962) ; In the Matter
of Bellamore, 17 App. Div. 2d 372, 376, 235 N.Y.S.2d 348, 352 (Sup. Ct. 1962);
control of the latter of two inconsistent and irreconcilable provisions, Robertson v.
United States, 310 F.2d 199, 202 (5th Cir. 1962); In the Matter of Quigley, 37
Misc. 2d 320, 324, 236 N.Y.S.2d 180, 185 (Surr. Ct. 1963) ; and others concerning the
use of grammar. For a list of twenty-four rules of construction see 3 JARMAN, WILLS
2068-72 (8th ed. 1951). See generally ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note 4, § 146; 2
PAGE op. cit. supra note 4, §§ 913-40; THoMwsoN, op. cit. supra note 4, §§ 210-30.
8 Houston Estate, 414 Pa. 579, 585, 201 A.2d 592, 595 (1964); accord, Pew
Trust, 411 Pa. 96, 107, 191 A2d 399, 405 (1963), 112 U. PA. L. REv. 290; Woodward
Estate, 407 Pa. 638, 640, 182 A.2d 732, 733 (1962); 2 PAGE, op. cit. supra note 4,
§ 918; THompsoN, op. cit. supra note 4, § 213.
9 In a majority of the cases, the court need do more than simply ascertain
the testator's subjective intent. The testator may actually have had no subjective
intention as to a particular problem, or, if he had one, his words may not have
articulated it. The court in applying the rules tends to a disposition which the
normal or average testator would have made if he had taken into account the state
of the law. See LEAcH & LOGAN, FUTURE INTERESTS AND ESTATE PLANNING 244
(1961); 8 PAGE, Op. cit. supra note 4, § 916, at 794; 1 SmtEs & SMITH, FUTURE
INTERESTS 449 (2d ed. 1956).
10 Cf. 112 U. PA. L. REv. 1083 (1964) (discussing a similar suggestion for the
distribution of incompetent's estate).
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with the traditional canons. For instance one canon suggests that the
court view the will in the light of the circumstances under which it was
written. The state of the law is a circumstance to be taken into account.",
This picture is not complete unless the motivation to minimize taxation is
considered. Another canon holds the general intent of the testator to be
more important than any specific devise. The general intent in making a
specific devise may well be to minimize taxes. A possible intention which
at first appears to be contrary to the presumption against an unjust or
absurd intent may appear, when viewed in light of inheritance and estate
tax consequences, to be a just and reasonable distribution.1
2
There will be occasions when the construction which will minimize
taxes will run counter to one or more of the canons. This occurrence is
not surprising since, for many wills, application of different canons will
lead to different results, even without consideration of the tax burden.1s In
the one appellate court decision to give weight to the tax considerations,
14
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had to face this problem of a conflict be-
tween rules. The court first stated that "in the construction of an
ambiguous testamentary provision, all the circumstances confronting the
testator when he made his will may be considered." 15 It went on to
assert that the "federal estate tax situation was a circumstance that would
properly have weight with him . ... ," ' However, a construction which
would favor reduction of the tax burden conflicted in this case with the
presumption in favor of the heirs at law, because the construction that
minimized taxes also disinherited the testator's widow. Nevertheless, the
court could not "believe that the testator, confronted with those alternatives
presented by the tax situation, intended . . ., 17 to leave his widow in
a worse position by providing for her in his will. It therefore permitted her
to take a larger amount outside the will.' 8 When the rules conflict, it is
the duty of the court to use its discretion and to apply the rule which, in
the light of what the court knows about the particular testator, will most
likely achieve that distribution which he actually intended.
In some situations construction of the will will not be necessary to
carry out the intent of the testator who wishes to minimize taxes. Marital
deduction formulas have been devised which are specifically written to
11THomsoN, op. cit. supra note 4, § 217, at 337.12 See, e.g., text accompanying notes 14-17 infra.
13 See Will of Bresnehan, 221 Wis. 51, 265 N.W. 93, 84 U. PA. L. REv. 1032
(1936).
14 Harris Estate, 351 Pa. 368, 41 A.2d 715 (1945).
15 351 Pa. at 380, 41 A.2d at 721.
1o Id. at 381, 41 A.2d at 721.
17 Id. at 382, 41 A.2d at 722.
18 The dissent in this case argued that, since the state court lacks expertise in
federal tax questions, a construction based on its expectation of the tax consequences
is likely to be erroneous. Id. at 403, 41 A.2d at 730-31. With the help of briefs
by counsel, however, even a court which lacks expertise is more likely to arrive at
a correct result by taking into account a relevant consideration than by ignoring
it completely.
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obtain the best tax treatment for the estate and heirs. 19 The problems of
construction would be greatly reduced if all people seeking to gain the
maximum deduction would use these formulas; most, however, do not. As
recently as 1961, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adjudicated its first
case involving such a formula.2 ° At that time it reported only eight
similar adjudications in the entire country.21 While additional cases have
been decided since that time,22 it is reasonable to assume that the formula
will is not going to be so widely employed that construction will never be
necessary to determine whether there was an intention to gain the deduc-
tion. The basic theory behind the construction of wills requires that heirs
not be denied some of the property that was intended to be left to them
simply because the intention has been articulated ambiguously.p
If the law has changed between the time the will was written and the
time of the testator's death, the court is faced with the problem of which
law to consider. Professor Page states: "[T]he law which was in force
when the will was executed is the law which determines the intention of
the testator unless the will shows that testator intends to be governed by
the law of some point of time other than that of the execution of the will." 24
Where the court proceeds upon a finding that the testator's distribution
was controlled by a desire to minimize taxes and that the specific distribu-
tion was an attempt to effectuate this intention, a change of law may alter
the distribution which will accomplish this purpose. Since the statutes
which the taxing authorities will apply are those on the books today, the
favorable treatment will not be achieved unless the law which determines
the distribution is that in effect at the death of the testator. A deter-
mination using the law at the time of execution will achieve the specific
disposition which appears to have been contemplated when the will was
written; but, since the law has changed, such a construction will at the
same time frustrate the controlling intent to secure the maximum tax
deduction. In such a case the courts should effectuate the apparent in-
tention by referring to existing law.2 5
19 See Casner, Estate Planning-Marital Deduction Provisions of Trusts, 64
HARv. L. REv. 582 (1951).
20 In re Althouse Estate, 404 Pa. 412, 172 A.2d 146 (1961).
21 Id. at 420, 172 A.2d at 150.
22 E.g., In re Umpleby's Will, 252 N.Y.S2d 674 (Surr. Ct. 1964); In the
Matter of Nickelsburg Estate, 34 Misc. 2d 82, 224 N.Y.S.2d 90 (Surr. Ct. 1961);
In the Matter of Gauff Estate, 27 Misc. 2d 407, 211 N.Y.S.2d 583 (Surr. Ct.
1960).
2 3 ATxnsoN, op. cit. supra note 4, § 146, at 812-13; THomPsox, op. cit. supra
note 4, § 214, at 330.
24 2 PAGE, op. cit. supra note 4, § 939, at 898-99.
2 5 Where it is shown that testator knew of the change in law, a failure to
rewrite the will suggests that tax minimization was not his controlling intention.
Courts may presume that the testator knew the law and took it into consideration
when he wrote his will. It would be something else again to presume that he
knew of changes in the law and kept his already-executed will up to date. The
court should carefully weigh the desirability of using the latter presumption against
the likelihood that the testator desired to minimize taxes. Cf. text accompanying
note 13 supra.
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It is also possible that, as a result of a change in law, all of the dis-
tributions which the words will bear carry equal tax burdens. Although
in such a situation no possible interpretation will effectuate the intention
to minimize taxes, the finding of such an intent will still be relevant, as it
does provide an indication of the specific distribution that the testator
probably contemplated. Therefore, the court should construe the will in
light of the tax law at the time of execution.
Finally, constructions which bore equal tax consequences at the time
of execution may, due to change in the law, actually entail different burdens.
In this case it is clear that, although the testator may have narrowed the
desirable distributions to a particular two or three because of desire to
reduce taxes, he did not consider the difference in taxes in deciding which
of these two or three distributions to direct. Therefore, if there is some
indication that the testator intended one particular interpretation, the court
should not consider the tax consequences. If it lacks this minimal indica-
tion, however, and if a general intention to minimize taxes is manifested in
other sections of the will, the court may conclude that the testator would
have arranged for the distribution entailing the lower tax burden if he had
known of the new law. In such a situation the court should order the
disposition which will minimize taxes.
26
Because a decision on the grounds suggested would reduce the estate's
tax liability, the Internal Revenue Service might ask the federal courts to
ignore it. In two cases, Freuler v. Helvering27 and Blair v. Commis-
sioner,28 the Supreme Court intimated that a federal court, although
normally bound by a state court construction of a will, would not be bound
in a tax case if the state decision was "collusive." In both cases, however,
the Court held the decisions to be noncollusive and therefore binding on
the federal courts. For thirty years the courts of appeals have been at-
tempting to define the term "collusive." One court recently made a
thorough search of the available cases "and admits to considerable un-
certainty as to the present state of the law." 29 It appears from the cases,
however, that collusion will not be found so long as there was a complete
presentation of the issues in an honestly contested proceeding.30 More-
261 have to do with a situation quite outside of anything which the tes-
tator had in contemplation, and it is therefore obvious that any solution is
bound to be verbal and indeed formal. Yet while it is idle to speculate upon
what he personally would have done had he been able to look ahead, courts
have always permitted themselves, within limits, to impute to testators an
intent which they could not foresee.
Boal v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, 292 Fed. 303, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (L.
Hand, J.).
27291 U.S. 35 (1934).
28 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
29 Northwest Security Nat'l Bank v. Welsh, 203 F. Supp. 263, 265 (D.S.D.
1962); see Note, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 569 (1963). See generally Stephens &
Freeland, The Role of Local Law and Local Adjudications in Federal Tax Con-
troversies, 46 MiNN. L. REv. 223 (1961); 112 U. PA. L. REv. 1191 (1964).
.0 The Court in Freuler spoke of collusion "in the sense that all the parties
joined in a submission of the issues and sought a decision which would adversely
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over, at least two circuits have held that giving notice of the tax issue
to the state court helps the taxpayer establish lack of collusion.31
affect the Government's right to additional income tax!' Freuler v. Helvering, 291
U.S. 35, 45 (1934). In approving the state decision it referred to certain conditions
which were found, such as notice to interested parties, presentation of all objections,
and the representation of all parties by counsel, so that the decision was in no sense
a consent decree. Ibid.
31Falk v. Commissioner, 189 F2d 806, 810 (3d Cir. 1951); Eisenmenger v.
Commissioner, 145 F.2d 103, 107 (8th Cir. 1944). Note, 30 U. CHi. L. REv. 569, 579
(1963), suggests imposition by the federal courts of a duty upon litigants to inform
the state court of the tax controversy as a means of assuring adequate consideration
of the tax issue on the merits. Another procedure that might help to provide ade-
quate consideration of the issue would be to inform the Commissioner of the
litigation. The Commissioner has announced, however, that "it is neither the policy
nor practice" of the Internal Revenue Service to enter litigation between private
parties in state courts, but he did not foreclose the possibility of exceptions. Mim.
6134, 4 CCH 1947 STAND. FED. TAx REP. § 6137 (April 3, 1947). A case in which
the Commissioner did intervene is Houston Estate, 414 Pa. 579, 201 A.2d 592
(1964).
